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This paper investigates the main individual driving forces of Hungarian household credit risk and measures the shock-
absorbing capacity of the banking system in relation to adverse macroeconomic events. The analysis relies on survey evidence
gathered by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) in January 2007. Our study presents three alternative ways of modelling
household credit risk, namely the financial margin, the logit and the neural network approaches, and uses these methods for
stress testing. Our results suggest that the main individual factors affecting household credit risk are disposable income, the
income share of monthly debt servicing costs, the number of dependants and the employment status of the head of the
household. The findings also indicate that the current state of indebtedness is unfavourable from a financial stability point of
view, as a relatively high proportion of debt is concentrated in the group of risky households. However, risks are somewhat
mitigated by the fact that a substantial part of risky debt is comprised of mortgage loans, which are able to provide
considerable security for banks in the case of default. Finally, our findings reveal that the shock-absorbing capacity of the
banking sector, as well as individual banks, is sufficient under the given loss rate (LGD) assumptions (i.e. the capital adequacy
ratio would not fall below the current regulatory minimum of 8 per cent) even if the most extreme stress scenarios were to
occur. 
JEL: C45, D14, E47, G21.
Keywords: financing stability, financial margin, logit model, neural network, stress test.
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Abstract
A tanulmány a háztartási hitelkockázatra ható fõbb egyedi tényezõk hatásait vizsgálja, illetve a különféle kedvezõtlen makro-
gazdasági eseményeknek a bankrendszeri sokktûrõ képességre gyakorolt azon hatását elemzi mely a háztartási hitelkockázat
változásán keresztül jelentkezik. A tanulmány a Magyar Nemzeti Bank által 2007 januárjában az eladósodott háztartások kö-
rében végzett kérdõíves felmérés eredményeire épül. A hitelkockázat mérését három módszerrel végezzük el (jövedelemtarta-
lék-számítás, logit és neurális háló modellek), melyeket stressztesztelésre is felhasználunk. Eredményeink szerint a fõ egyéni
kockázati tényezõk a háztartás rendelkezésre álló jövedelme, a jövedelemarányos törlesztési teher az eltartottak száma és a csa-
ládfõ munkaerõ-piaci helyzete. Elmondható továbbá, hogy az eladósodottság jelenlegi szerkezete kedvezõtlen pénzügyi stabi-
litási szempontból, mivel a hitelállomány relatíve jelentõs hányada van kifeszített pénzügyi és jövedelmi helyzetû háztartások
birtokában. A kockázatokat azonban némileg csökkenti, hogy a kockázatos hitelállomány számottevõ része jelzálogalapú hi-
tel, mely azonban megfelelõ fedezetet nyújthat a bankok számára az ügyfél nem teljesítése esetén is. Végül stresszteszt-ered-
ményeink szerint, mind az egyes bankok, mind a bankrendszer sokktûrõ képessége megfelelõ, vagyis a veszteségrátákra tett
feltevések mellett a legszélsõségesebb forgatókönyvek bekövetkezése esetén sem csökkenne a tõkemegfelelési mutató a jelen-
legi szabályozói minimumnak tekintett 8 százalékos szint alá.
Összefoglaló
The indebtedness of Hungarian households has grown substantially in recent years. The total debt outstanding rose from HUF
516 billion at the end of 1999 to HUF 6,074 billion by the end of 2006. In line with this, the debt to yearly disposable income
ratio rose from 8 per cent to 39 per cent over the same period. Both the demand and the supply side, as well as regulatory
factors contributed to this phenomenon. On the demand side favourable macroeconomic circumstances (decreasing
inflationary environment, strong economic growth) and improving income prospects (EU convergence) were the main driving
forces. On the other hand, regulatory and supply-side factors also supported growth. In 2000 the government introduced an
interest subsidy scheme in connection with forint mortgage loans for housing construction, which was a substantial driving
force of growing indebtedness. This effect was further accelerated by the banks’ aggressive expansion strategies, which aimed
at extracting the untapped possibilities in the retail lending market and which forced them to focus on product innovation
(FX lending) and ease the credit standards. 
However, the prevailing trends in the retail lending market raised concerns about the sustainability of credit expansion and
the ability of individuals to meet their debt obligations comfortably. The recent slowdown in economic activity has intensified
these concerns.
1
Although in the household sector the level of indebtedness is far below that of developed economies,
2
the debt service burden
(principal and interest payment) as a share of yearly disposable income is 10 per cent, which is approaching the level of
western EU countries, due to the unfavourable (i.e. short) maturity structure of loans. This is exaggerated by the degree of
leverage (debt to financial assets), which rose from 6 per cent to 26 per cent between 1999 and 2006, and the growing share
of foreign currency debt. The latter induces additional risk components: the change of debt servicing costs as a result of
exchange rate movements. 
Calculating these indicators for the indebted households which are most relevant to the financial sector, a far more
unfavourable picture emerges. Within the group of indebted households the debt to yearly disposable income ratio is 94 per
cent, indebted households spend on average 18 per cent of their income on debt servicing and the stock of debt within this
category is 7.5 times higher than the stock of financial savings.
3
This phenomenon is unfavourable from a financial stability
point of view, as it indicates that a substantial part of debt is granted to households with limited resources. 
In these circumstances, adverse developments in the macro economy may lead to a large number of households defaulting.
This may result in a decrease in consumption and investment expenditures, and also worsens the profitability of the financial
sector by generating higher loan losses. As a consequence, it is of great importance to continuously monitor and measure
household credit risk. 
In the empirical literature two research directions can be distinguished in the measurement of households’ credit risk, the
‘macro’ and ‘micro’ approaches. They differ along two principal dimensions, namely whether individual information about
households is utilised or not, and the econometric techniques used for measuring the effects of macroeconomic developments
on bank losses. While the ‘macro’ approach employs only aggregate information and interrelates bank losses and
macroeconomic developments directly by usually applying time series econometric techniques, the ‘micro’ approach uses
individual data as well, and measures the effects of the macro environment on bank losses indirectly by commonly using
discrete choice models. 
In the ‘macro’ approach the short-term evolution of losses (usually proxied by loan loss provisions, nonperforming loan ratios,
write off to loan ratios, etc.) and their interactions with aggregate sector specific and macro variables are analysed. Froyland
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1. Introduction
1 As it is noted by the Report on Financial Stability 2007, the fiscal package announced in the summer of 2006 imposes substantial burdens on economic agents. Due
to higher taxes and inflation, households’ real income is projected to drop by more than 3 per cent in 2007, and may only rise modestly in 2008. In the corporate sector,
higher taxes will push up the cost of capital and the wage costs, which may resulted in a decline of the profitability level.
2 The level of indebtedness (debt to yearly disposable income) in some selected western EU countries is as follows: France 83 per cent, Italy 60 per cent, Spain 105 per
cent, United Kingdom 160 per cent (Source: OECD). 
3 The results are based on survey evidence gathered by the MNB in January 2007.
and Larsen (2002) applied linear regression techniques for analysing the effects of the macro environment on banking sector
losses. The main drawback of their approach is that the possible feedback effects from the banking sector to the economy
cannot be detected and the problem of endogeneity arises. In their model estimation those macro and household sector related
variables which significantly influence banks’ household loan portfolio quality were the debt to income ratio, real housing
wealth, banks’ nominal lending rate and the unemployment rate. 
On the other hand, Hoggart and Zicchino (2004), and Marcucci and Quagliariello (2005) used vector autoregressions (VAR).
The main advantage of VARs is that they allow capturing the interactions among variables and the feedback effects from the
banking sector to the real economy. In this sense VARs provide an ideal framework for financial stability purposes, although it
has to be mentioned that simple VARs are not capable of handling the problem of asymmetries, whose role is strengthened under
stress conditions – Drehmann et al. (2006). Therefore, the effects of adverse macroeconomic developments on bank losses might
be underestimated. Marcucci and Quagliariello (2005) found that the main macro drivers of banks’ household portfolio quality
are the output gap, the level of indebtedness and the inflation rate. In the study of Hoggart and Zicchino (2004) the authors
found little evidence that changes in macroeconomic activity have a substantial impact on aggregate and unsecured write-offs. In
contrast, they found a clear statistical impact of income gearing, interest rates and the output gap on secured write-offs. 
The ‘micro’ approach provides an alternative way of modelling risks. It handles the problem of ‘aggregation’ by utilising
individual information and is able to link both idiosyncratic and systemic factors of credit risk to bank losses. Therefore, it
provides a more accurate way of loss measurement by using default probability (PD), exposure and loss given default (LGD)
data. The ‘micro’ approach was employed by May and Tudela (2005), who estimated a random effect probit model for
studying the effects of household micro attributes and some selected macro variables on the probability of secured debt
payment problems. Their results suggest that the main macro driving force of payment problems is the mortgage interest rate.
At the household level, interest gearing of 20 per cent and above and high LTVs significantly influence the probability of
payment problems. 
Herrala and Kauko (2007) within a simple logit framework analyse how the probability of being financially distressed depends
on household disposable income and debt servicing costs. They found that the two macro factors which substantially influence
households’ payment ability were unemployment and interest rates. 
The adaptation of the macro approach for Hungary would not provide accurate information about the potential risks and
vulnerabilities for the household sector for at least three reasons. The lack of an adequate loss indicator is one of the main
drawbacks. Neither the stock (non performing loan), nor the flow (loan loss provision) measures of losses can proxy
accurately the risks on the aggregate, as they suffer from the substantial role of portfolio cleaning. In addition, the former
cannot reflect promptly the evolution of the business cycle. The second ‘drawback’ is that the period in which retail lending
became dominant (the past 7-8 years) was not characterised by substantial macro turbulences, therefore the portfolio quality
was rather stable (i.e. aggregate loss indicators do not show much variability through time). As a result, we are unable to
correctly judge the effects of adverse macro movements on banks’ portfolio quality by using these measures in a macro
econometric framework. Finally, these indicators for different household loan products before 2004 are not available. 
As a result we decided to analyse household sector credit risk by applying the ‘micro’ approach, building on survey evidence
gathered by the MNB in January 2007. 
The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, by using micro level household data we determine the main idiosyncratic
driving forces of credit risk and analyse whether the current state of indebtedness threatens financial stability. Second, we
examine the shock-absorbing capacity of the banking system in relation to adverse shocks.
Our study extends the existing literature on household credit risk modelling in two ways. This is the first study which uses
micro level data for analysing household credit risk, the potential sources of vulnerabilities and the shock-absorbing capacity
of the banking system in Hungary. Second, we compare three different methods (logit, artificial neural network and financial
margin approaches) of household credit risk measurement and use these for stress testing. 
Our findings suggest that the main individual factors affecting household credit risk are disposable income, the income share
of monthly debt servicing costs, the number of dependants and the employment status of the head of the household. The
INTRODUCTION
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results also show that the current state of indebtedness is unfavourable from a financial stability point of view, as a relatively
high share of debt is concentrated in the group of risky households. Risks are somewhat mitigated by the fact that a substantial
part of risky debt is comprised of mortgage loans, which are able to provide considerable security for banks in the case of
default. In the stress testing exercise, by analysing the effects of declining employment and rising debt servicing costs, the
results indicate that the household loan portfolio quality is more sensitive to exchange rate depreciation and a CHF interest
rate rise than to an HUF interest rate increase, which is due to the denomination and repricing structure of the portfolio. In
the case of declining employment, the banking sector would face the highest losses if the total number of new unemployed is
concentrated within services, followed by industry, commerce and agriculture. Finally, our findings suggest that the shock-
absorbing capacity of the banking sector, as well as individual banks, is sufficient under the given loss rate (LGD) assumptions,
that is the capital adequacy ratio would not fall below the current regulatory minimum of 8 per cent even if the most extreme
stress scenarios were to occur. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data set used and provide the theoretical set-
up of the models. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and finally section 4 offers a concluding summary.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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In this section, first we briefly describe the data set employed and then give a short technical overview about the methods
used for calculating the probability of default and risky debt (we refer to this as debt at risk). Finally, the model validation
approach is presented. 
2.1. DATA DESCRIPTION4
The employed data set derives from a survey conducted by the MNB among indebted households in January 2007.
5
For the survey a questionnaire was compiled containing four different sections: financial standing of households, credit block,
financial savings and personal characteristics. The two main parts of the questionnaire were the financial standing and credit
blocks. The former included information about the household’s disposable income, real wealth, consumption and overhead
expenditures. The credit block was divided further into three sub parts: secured, unsecured blocks and the third part included
general questions about debt (i.e. relation to debt, future plans about credit market participation, etc.) and payment problems.
In the credit block the respondents were asked about the parameters of their loan(s) (amount, maturity, monthly debt
servicing costs, denomination, year of borrowing, number of loan contracts, etc.). The final sample included 1,046 households
having some type of credit.
The information received concerning wealth and income was treated with caution for two reasons. On the one hand, it is
difficult to involve high-income groups in a questionnaire-based survey, which might bias the sample’s income distribution.
On the other hand, obtaining reliable information on households’ financial situation is difficult in general, given the high
degree of distrust in Hungary. There is not a generally accepted technique handling the uncertainty apparent in income
information, but as the results might be sensitive to this we tried to look at this issue as deeply as possible.
6
Since we received information about each household member (age, qualification, employment status), it allowed us to
determine the minimal income a certain household with specific parameters should have.
7
In cases when the income calculated
in this way was higher than disclosed, we made an adjustment (allowing only one category shift, that is a HUF 20,000
increase). As the high degree of uncertainty in connection with black income remained still relevant after the first correction,
we decided to increase income data by an additional 10 per cent.
8
2.2. NON-PARAMETRIC CREDIT RISK MEASUREMENT
A simple way of measuring household credit risk involves the calculation of the households’ financial margin (or income
reserve). The idea behind this approach is that the margin can be an appropriate proxy of default risk, as its size promptly
reflects the evolution of households’ payment ability. The financial margin is the difference between monthly disposable
income and the sum of consumption expenditures and debt servicing costs, and can be expressed as follows:
(2.1)
where fm is the financial margin, is the disposable income, y is the consumption expenditures and ds is the debt servicing costs
of household i.
( )iiii dscyfm +−≡
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2. Methodological background
4 Descriptive statistics of some selected variables can be found in Table A in Appendix 2.
5 Data were collected by the market research institute Gfk Hungária Kft. In the data collection processes, the aim was to ensure both the regional as well as the income
representativity of the sample. Concerning the regional distribution of loans, previous surveys of Gfk Hungária Kft. provided a priori information, while income
representativity was assured by posterior weighting. Data collection was performed with the ‘random walk method’ as this ensures that households have equal
probability of getting into the sample. Selected households were sought personally. 
6 The high degree of uncertainty regarding the income information is especially problematic in the case of the non-parametric calculations and simulations.
7 We determined the minimum income for a household based on the prevailing minimum wage, unemployment aid and old-age pension.
8 The calculations are prepared in the case of the non-parametric approach by using the original and the adjusted (i.e. additional 10 per cent higher) income as well.
Regarding the parametric approaches, it is irrespective from the results viewpoint which income data is used, since not the income levels but the position of the
household in the income distribution is employed in the calculations. 
Using this simple static framework for measuring credit risk, we make two simplifying assumptions. First, it is assumed that
only those households default whose financial margin is negative (strict default interpretation), which means that after paying
out the basic living costs the remaining income is less than the debt servicing costs. Second, we presume that assets and
liabilities are fixed in the short run, so borrowing further when problems occur is not possible. Interpreting default in this
framework denotes that households with negative financial margin have a default probability of one, and those with positive
have a zero probability of default. The average unconditional default probability is the share of households with negative
financial margin within the sample, and debt at risk is the share of the exposure of the financial sector to these households
within total loans outstanding. 
The main shortcomings of this approach are the implicit assumption of homogeneous individual default probabilities within
risk categories and the identical zero default barrier, which might substantially differ among households. What we do know
is that households with negative margin might be riskier than those with positive margin, but to what extent is not known.
From a financial stability point of view, the ‘underestimation’ of default probabilities in the ‘non default’ category (i.e. zero
PDs) is more problematic than the ‘overestimation’ of PDs in the ‘default category’ (i.e. PD is equal to one), as we do not
know the net effect (i.e. whether the ‘underestimation effect’ is more than offset by the ‘overestimation effect’ or not). 
2.3. PARAMETRIC CREDIT RISK MEASUREMENT
This section presents a simple logit and an artificial neural network model for calculating default probabilities and debt at
risk. The methods employed are also static (i.e. the assumption of fixed assets and liabilities in the short run is still held), but
for each household in the sample an individual conditional PD can be assigned in relation to their financial and personal
characteristics. The main advantage of these models is that the results depend less on the ambiguous income and consumption
levels than in the case of the financial margin for at least two reasons. First, the dependent variable differs
9
(i.e. falling into a
more than one month payment arrear or not) in a way which is not directly sensitive for consumption and income data;
second, the methods used for calculating default probabilities are not linear, that is the calculated average conditional PD is
less sensitive to income uncertainty than the average unconditional PD of the non-parametric approach.
10
2.3.1. The logit approach
Model description
The default problem can be analysed within a simple binary choice framework. The respondent either did not (Y=0) or did
have (Y=1) payment problems during the period in which the survey was conducted. It is assumed that a set of factors in
vector x explains the decision, that is  
(2.2)
(2.3)
The parameters β reflect the impact of changes in x on the probability. Assuming that the error term is logistically distributed,
the conditional default probability is calculated as follows:
( ) ( )β,10Pr xFxYob −==
( ) ( )β,1Pr xFxYob ==
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9 Default variable for the parametric approaches could have been constructed by using the financial margin of households (i.e. households with negative financial
margin are considered to be in default, those having positive have no payment problems). As this definition by construction is very sensitive to income and
consumption data quality and has other shortcomings as well (namely the identically zero default barrier assumption described above), in the parametric approaches
this default definition was not employed.  
10 The relationship between the two default definitions (i.e. those are in default whose financial margin is negative, and, according to the second, those are in default
whose arrears exceed one month) applied in this paper might be biased by several factors. First, the uncertainty regarding the disposable income can be mentioned;
second, the time inconsistency originated from the difference of the financial situation of the households when default happened and when the survey was
conducted. In the ‘optimal case’, when a household falls into arrears or defaulting, then its margin is the lowest or might be negative; therefore, the two definitions
coincide with each other. Despite the previously mentioned problems, it can be observed that the financial margin of those whose arrears exceed one month is by
30,000 HUF lower on average than the margin of those having no payment problems, so in this sense both definitions can be used as a good proxy of default risk
and also show some coincidence. 
(2.4)
where Λ(βx′) indicates the logistic cumulative distribution function. By using the individual PDs and debt outstanding, debt
at risk can be expressed as follows:
(2.5)
where z is the loan amount of household i and N is the number of observations.
Estimation of the logit model
The estimations are performed in two ways. In the first case the total sample is applied, while in the second case the
calculations are performed on a sub sample, which consists of an equal number of defaulters and non-defaulters. In both cases
75 per cent of the samples are used for estimation, while 25 per cent is employed for model validation purposes. The
observations are randomly selected into the particular groups. 
We divide the explanatory variables into two categories, groups of financial and personal characteristics. The financial
characteristics category contains the households’ disposable income,
11
the income share of monthly debt servicing costs, the
debt to income ratio (debt to yearly disposable income), financial savings, real wealth, number of debt contracts and type of
debt contracts (FX, HUF, both). The personal characteristics group includes the job status, age, qualification, gender of the
head of the household, the number of dependants and the region of residence. In defining the dependent variable we
considered a household to be in default if it had experienced payment problems in the previous 12 months and the arrears
exceeded one month.
12
The covariates, except the debt servicing cost, debt to income, number of loan contracts, real and financial wealth, and
number of dependants get into the model as dummies, since dummies capture the position of the particular household in the
distribution of the variable in question.
13
For the estimations the stepwise maximum likelihood method is employed, as it enables us to find the optimal regression
function. The stepwise method is a widely used approach of variable selection and is especially useful when theory gives no
clear direction regarding which inputs to include when the set of available potential covariates is large. The inclusion of
irrelevant variables not only does not help prediction, it reduces forecasting accuracy through added noise or systemic bias.
14
The stepwise procedure involves identifying an initial model, iteratively adding or removing a predictor variable from the
model previously visited according to a stepping criterion and, finally, terminating the search when adding or removing
variables is no longer possible given the specified criteria. The regression was run by using the p-value of 0.1 as a criterion
for adding or deleting variables from the subsets considered at each iteration. 
We also test the heteroscedasticity of the residuals by carrying out the LM test using the artificial regression method described
by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). The results suggest that we have little evidence against the null hypothesis of
homoscedasticity. Table 1 presents the estimated model parameters. 
∑
∑
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11 As in the models, due to income uncertainty, the relative position of households in the income distribution is used, the results are not sensitive to correction in income
levels (i.e. 10 per cent higher income).
12 A table about the explanatory variable set used can be found in Table B in Appendix 2.
13 In order to avoid perfect collinearity a control group has to be selected. The reference household possesses the following attributes: the household income is in the
third quintile, it has FX debt, lives in central Hungary, the head of the household has a medium qualification, works as an employee, is between 31 and 39 years old
and is male. The reference group is selected to describe the attributes of an average household in the sample.
14 The main limitation of the stepwise procedure is that it presumes the existence of a single subset of variables and seeks to identify it. 
The results indicate that, irrespective of the data set used (i.e. whether the number of defaulted households are balanced or
not), the job status of the head of the household (i.e. whether he/she is unemployed or not), the number of dependants, the
income share of debt servicing costs and income have significant effects with the expected signs
15
regarding probability of
default. The job status of the head proxies whether the household is in the ‘low income’ state. Unemployment increases the
likelihood of having payment problems as this is the main source of unexpected changes in income. The relationship between
payment problems and the number of dependants is also positive, as the larger the family the more it is exposed to expense
shocks. The effect of income on the default probability is also evident, as being in higher income quintiles decreases the
probability of payment problems. In addition to its traditional channels, the ‘income effect’ also exerts its effect through the
debt servicing cost ratio, i.e. a fall in disposable income increases the debt servicing cost ratio. If this ratio is high, it increases
the likelihood of payment problems as it prevents the accumulation of reserves and makes these households more exposed to
the negative consequences of rising debt servicing, basic living costs or income loss.
2.3.2. The neural network approach
As an alternative of the logit, we use artificial neural networks (ANN) to model default probability. The main advantage of
artificial network models is the ability to deal with problems in which relationships among variables and the underlying
nonlinearities are not well known. For a detailed description of neural networks, their main attributes, architectures and
workings see Sargent (1993) and Beltratti et al. (1996). Here we give a brief overview of the simple network model used.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Model
Logit 1 Logit 2
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Dependent variable
Default
Expalantory variables
Constant -5.197*** (0.517) -2.898*** (0.806)
Job status
Unemployed 1.806*** (0.467) 2.023*** (0.835)
Other inactive 1.462* (0.850)
Share of monthly debt serv. cost 3.921*** (1.016) 6.264*** (2.073)
Income 
Quintile 1 0.716* (0.372)
Quintile 5 -1.631* (0.935) -2.012* (1.213)
Number of dependants 0.314** (0.143) 0.495** (0.239)
Goodness of fit measures
R2 0.151 0.288
LM_test for heteroskedasticity
LM test-stat 2.034 3.560
p-value 0.154 0.060
Number of observations
Total 785 54
Defaulted 27 27
Non-defaulted 758 27
Table 1
Estimated model parameters
Note: *, **, *** denote that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level.
15 In order to get information about the size of these effects on the probability of default, the marginal effects of the variables of interest have to be determined. As two
logit models are estimated, the marginal effects are calculated from the one that performs better according to the model validation test. We return to this question
in the results chapter.
Model description
The network has three basic components: neurons, an interconnection ‘rule’ and a learning scheme. Depending on its
complexity, a network consists of one input layer, one or more intermediate or hidden layers, and one output layer. 
The key element of the network is the neuron, which is composed of two parts – a combination and an activation function.
The combination function computes the net input of the neuron, which is usually the weighted sum of the inputs, while the
activation function is a function which generates output given the net input. 
We begin with the specification of the combination function for the output layer as
(2.6)
where y is the output (default, non-default), a
j
is the hidden node value for node j, θ
j
’s are the node weights and q is the
number of hidden nodes. Constraining the output of a neuron to be within the 0 and 1 interval is a standard procedure. For
this purpose we use the sigmoid function.
16
The a
j
’s are the values at hidden node j, and are expressed as follows:
(2.7)
if S has a sigmoid form, then
(2.8)
where the x
i
’s are the inputs at node i and S is the activation function. There are q
j
inputs at hidden node j. The w
ji
’s are the
parameters at the jth hidden node for the ith input. Thus, by inputting the variables (i.e. the household’s personal and financial
characteristics and the variable that proxies the default), our goal is to find the parameters θ and w which make our functions
most closely fit the data. 
The predicted individual default probabilities come directly from the model and are denoted by y
∧
t
. Using the individual PDs
from the network, debt at risk is calculated as follows:
(2.9)
where z is the loan amount of household i and N is the number of observations.
Training the network 
The selection of input variables in neural network models is also a crucial question, as the final models’ performance heavily
depends on the inputs used. Regarding the networks, we apply the variables selected by a feature selection algorithm called
minimal-redundancy-maximal-relevance criterion (mRMR). A detailed description of mRMR can be found in Peng et al. (2005).
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16 Other functions such as the logistic are also suitable.
17 The MATLAB code of the mRMR can be downloaded from the following website: http://research.janelia.org/peng/proj/mRMR/index.htm. 
Here we briefly summarise the main aspects of feature selection based on this method. As a first step of the variable selection
procedure the mRMR incremental selection is used to select a predefined number of sequential features n from the input variable
set X. This leads to n sequential feature sets (S
1
⊂ S
2
⊂ ... S
n
). Following comparison of the feature sets, the next step is to find a
range of k, (1 ≤ k ≤ n) within which the cross validation classification error has both small mean and variance. Within the set of
the classification errors the smallest has to be found, and the optimal size of the candidate feature set is chosen as the smallest k
corresponds to the smallest classification error. The main advantages of mRMR are that it both maximises dependency and
minimises redundancy between the output and input variables, it handles the problem of bivariate variable selection (i.e.
individually good features do not necessarily lead to good classification performance), and it is computationally efficient. Table 2
presents the selected variables by the stepwise and mRMR methods.
The network training process begins by choosing the starting values of the weights. Then by feeding the network with the
selected inputs (i.e. x
i
), the output is calculated and compared to a known target (i.e. the binary outcomes – default, non
default), and the corresponding error is computed. The optimisation is done by changing the weights θ and w, so that the
square of the separation between the predicted and actual values of y is minimised:18
(2.10)
where N refers to the number of observations.
As estimation problems are sometimes characterised by non convexities and may have local optimal solutions which might differ
from the global optimal ones, we employ a number of different starting values in order to check for global convergence.
It also has to be mentioned that when using neural networks for default modelling purposes the sample size and its
‘composition’ regarding the output variable is a crucial issue. On the one hand, the literature suggests that the predictive
power of the networks strongly depends on the share of defaulters and non-defaulters, i.e. when the share of defaulters and
non-defaulters is balanced, the network gives the most reliable prediction. On the other hand, small samples allow only
limited degrees of freedom, as a relatively simple neural network contains numerous weights that may lead to ‘overtraining’
– Gonzalez (2000). 
( )
2
1
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mRMR method stepwise method
Selected input\Training sample size 785 54 785 54
Job status
Unemployed X X X X
Other inactive X
Number of dependants X X X X
Income 
Quintile 1 X X
Quintile 5 X X X
Financial saving X X
Share of monthly debt serv. cost X X X X
Number of selected variables 5 5 5 5
Table 2
Selected input variables by the mRMR and stepwise methods
18 For this nonlinear optimisation procedure the Newton method is used.
Overtraining means that, instead of the general problem, the ‘nature’ of the data set is ‘learned’. In order to avoid this, the
same 75 per cent of the data sets as in the logit models is employed for training the network, and the remaining 25 per cent
for validation purposes.
19
The modelling experiments suggest that the network architecture with three layers (one input, one
hidden and one output layer) and with two neurons in the hidden (or intermediate) layer produces the most reliable results
in terms of classification accuracy on the validation sample. In the first neuron of the hidden layer the effects from the
financial characteristics are aggregated, while in the second neuron the effects from the personal characteristics of the
household are grouped. On Chart 1 the network architecture of the second network (Network 2) model is portrayed. Table
3 shows the input weights and the estimated logit coefficients. Network weights with positive signs indicate an amplifier effect
of the weight in question, while the negative signs denote the ‘attenuative’ effect of the particular weight. As the variables in
the data set have very different magnitudes, data were scaled to be roughly of the same magnitude and thereby increase the
probability of finding an optimal set of parameter estimates. 
METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
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19 There is no theoretical or empirical rule about the optimal share of ‘training’ and ‘testing’ sub samples, the 75-25 per cent partition is often used in the literature. 
Chart 1
Network architecture of the second network model (Network 2)
2.4. MODEL VALIDATION AND SELECTION
As we have four different models (two logits and two networks), validating them is necessary in order to select the best ones
for further analysis. The main purpose of the application of sound model validation techniques is to reduce model risk. When
comparing two or more credit risk models, irrespective of the particular performance measures used, there are at least four
rules which should be considered. First, when performance measures are sample dependent, the different models have to be
compared on the same dataset.
20
Second, samples should be representative of the general population of obligors. Third, the
data sets used for model estimations and validations should differ. Fourth, robustness of the employed performance measures
has to be determined by calculating confidence intervals. 
The literature of model selection and validation techniques is quite broad – for a detailed description see Burnham and
Anderson (1998). Here we limit our attention to the most commonly used validation technique, the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) method.
21
Its use is a standard part of establishing model performance in accordance with the New
Capital Accords of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Below we briefly explain the ROC curve concept by using
Sobehart and Keenan’s (2001) notation; then we present our model validation results based on the ROC concept.
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Logit 1 Network 1 Logit 2 Network 2
Coefficients Input weights Coefficients Input weights
Dependent variable
Default
Expalantory variables
Constant -5.197*** -2.898***
Job status
Unemployed 1.806*** 1.724 2.023*** 0.332
Other inactive 1.462*
Share of monthly debt serv. cost 3.921*** 3.651 6.264*** 13.006
Financial saving -0.921 -5.868
Income 
Quintile 1 0.716* 48.469
Quintile 5 -1.631* 3.314 -2.012*
Number of dependants 0.314** 0.973 0.495** 24.099
Goodness of fit measures
R2 0.151 0.288
Number of observations
Total 785 785 54 54
Defaulted 27 27 27 27
Non-defaulted 758 758 27 27
Table 3
Estimated logit parameters and neural network weights
Note: *, **, *** denote that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level.
20 To see this, consider two default prediction models, X and Y, and assume that both models are capable of sorting riskiness with perfect accuracy. Model X is applied
to sample X1, where 4 per cent of the observations are defaults, and Y is applied to sample Y1, where 8 per cent of the observations are defaults. Then we sort the
samples and select a cut-off value of the worst 4 per cent of scored observations. Since the models have, by assumption, perfect accuracy, the fact that the
performance of model X on sample X1 is 100 per cent, while the performance of model Y on sample Y1 is only 50 per cent at the same cut-off, indicates that model
X is better than model Y because of the higher capture rate – though this is wrong. The problem is that the selected cut-off has a different meaning in terms of sample
rejection for any two samples with a different number of defaults.
21 There other widely used measures are the cumulative accuracy profile (CAP) and its summary statistics, the accuracy ratio (AR), and the conditional information
entropy ratio (CIER). The CAP is similar to the described ROC curve concept. The basic idea of CIER is to compare the uncertainty of the unconditional default
probability of the sample (frequency of defaults), with the uncertainty of the conditional default probability. 
2.4.1. The ROC curve concept
When the classification accuracy of a model is analysed, a cut-off value (C) is selected in order to classify the debtors. Debtors
with rating scores or PDs below the cut-off value are considered as defaulters and debtors with scores above the cut-off value
are considered as non-defaulters. If the score is below the cut-off value and the debtor defaults, the classification decision was
correct. If the score is above the cut-off value and the debtor does not default, the classification was also correct. In all other
cases, the obligors were wrongly classified. 
Employing Sobehart and Keenan’s (2001) notation, the hit rate HR(C) is defined as follows:
(2.11)
where H(C) is the number of defaulters correctly predicted with cut-off value C, and ND is the total number of defaulters in
the sample. The false alarm rate FAR(C) can be expressed as follows:
(2.12)
where F(C) is the number of non-defaulters incorrectly classified as defaulters, by using the cut-off value C, and NND refers
to the total number of non-defaulters in the sample.
For all the cut-off values that are contained in the range of the scores the quantities of HR(C) and FAR(C) are calculated. 
The ROC curve is the plot of HR(C) versus FAR(C). The better the model’s performance, the closer the ROC curve is to the
point (0,1). Denoting the area below the ROC curve by A it can be calculated as follows:
(2.13)
This measure is usually between 0.5 and 1.0 for rating models in practice. A perfect model would have an area below the
ROC curve of 1 or 100 per cent, because this means all of the defaulting observations have a default probability greater than
the PDs of the remaining observations. When the value is 0.5 or 50 per cent it indicates a worthless model because the
defaulters are indistinguishable from the median non-defaulter. For calculating the confidence interval for A the concept of
Bamber (1975) is followed. Derivations and proofs can be found in Bamber’s article.
22
2.4.2. Model validation results
Calculating the area below the ROC curves, A and confidence intervals, for both the logit and the neural network models,
the remaining 25 per cent of the sample, the validation sample is used. In Table 4 the estimated size of the area below the
ROC curve and its confidence band can be seen for the four models.
23
Although the number of defaults in both samples is the
same, the share of defaulters within the samples is different. Therefore, only those models are comparable whose database is
the same in size. It has to be noted that, when judging models’ classification accuracy, not only the size of the area below the
ROC curve matters but also its standard error and the range of its confidence band. Regarding the larger samples, the logit
seems to perform better. Although the area below the ROC curve is slightly smaller than in the network model (Network 1),
both the standard deviation and the confidence band range are smaller. When the number of defaulters and non-defaulters is
( ) ( )FARdFARHRA ∫=1
0
( ) ( )
NND
CF
CFAR =
( ) ( )
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CHR =
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22 It should be noted that for a good approximation of the confidence band for A by using Bamber’s method there should be at least around 50 defaults in the sample.
When there are a few numbers of defaults, the normal approximation might be problematic. However, Engelmann and Tasche (2003) empirically showed that for the
cases with very few defaults in the validation sample, the approximation does not lead to completely misleading results. We also check the robustness of our
validation results by randomly drawing three sub portfolios. The first sub-group contains 36 defaulters and 225 non-defaulters, the second 25 defaulters and 236 non-
defaulters; the third consists of 10 defaulters and 251 non-defaulters. Our results suggest that the boundaries of the confidence bands differ by about 3-6 percentage
points.
23 The ROC curves of the four models can be found in Appendix 1.
balanced, the network outperforms the logit. This result coincides with the literature showing that the performance of neural
networks in default modelling depends on the sample share of defaulters and non-defaulters. The consequence of the
validation process is that the first logit model (Logit 1) and the second network model (Network 2) are employed for further
analysis.
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ROC area Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] Validation sample size Non defaulted
(N) (N)
Logit 1 0.820 0.032 [0.757 , 0.883] 261 252
Network 1 0.827 0.070 [0.690 , 0.964] 261 252
Logit 2 0.796 0.050 [0.697 , 0.894] 18 9
Network 2 0.889 0.079 [0.735 , 0.978] 18 9
Table 4
Estimated areas below the ROC curve and their confidence bands
In this chapter we first determine the effects of the model variables on the probability of default by using the first logit (Logit1)
and the second network (Network 2) models, then we analyse how the PDs and debt at risk are distributed along various
dimensions and determine the concentration risk. Finally we present our stress testing exercise and analyse the shock-
absorbing capacity of the banking system. 
3.1. MARGINAL EFFECTS
The estimation results suggested that six variables have sizeable effects on the default probability (1
st
and 5
th
income quintiles,
share of debt servicing cost, number of dependants, the job status of the head of the household, and the financial saving). As
the estimated coefficients give the direction but not necessarily the size of the effect the particular variable has on the
probability of default, the marginal effects have to be calculated. In the logit framework the marginal effect of a continuous
variable can be expressed as follows:
(2.14)
where x′ is the vector of covariates and β is the vector of estimated parameters, while the marginal effects23 from the above
described network model can be calculated according to the following formula:
(2.15)
The marginal effects of the model variables are presented in Table 5.
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Note: the marginal effects were first evaluated at every observation and then the individual effects were averaged.
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3. Results
Logit 1 Network 2
Job status
Unemployed 5.66 0.81
Share of monthly debt serv. cost 7.38 8.94
Income
Quintile 1 1.93 3.20
Quintile 5 -2.33
Financial saving -3.87
Number of dependants 0.58 0.09
Table 5
Marginal effects from the logit and network models 
(percentage points)
24 It should be mentioned that when using this formula for computing the marginal effect a dummy variable is not appropriate; however, the derivative approximation
is often accurate.
Table 5 suggest that among the factors analysed, the employment status of the head (i.e. whether he/she is unemployed or
not) and the share of debt servicing cost have the most sizeable impact (in absolute value) on default probability. This means
that when comparing two households which differ only in the employment status of the household’s head but are otherwise
the same, the two models used for calculating the marginal effects, Logit 1 and the Network 2, produce a 5.66 and a 0.81
percentage point default probability difference respectively. The difference in the default probability between the two
households differs only in the debt servicing cost ratio, which is 7.38 and 8.94 percentage points respectively. 
The effect of dummies can be evaluated not only at the sample mean but on the whole probability distribution by plotting the
probability response curves (PRC) – Greene (2003).
25
With these curves it is possible to examine how the predicted
probabilities vary with an independent variable. We analyse the effects of unemployment and 5
th
quintile dummies in this way
as a function of the number of dependants and the share of monthly debt servicing cost. The marginal effect in this case is
the difference between the two functions.
Chart 2 shows the probability response curves of unemployment as a function of the number of dependants, while Chart 3
depicts the ‘unemployment effect’ as a function of the share of debt servicing cost. The marginal effect of unemployment
ranges from 2 when the number of dependants is 1, to about 13 percentage points when it approaches 6, which shows that
the probability a household will default after the job loss of the main wage earner is far greater for those where the number
of dependants is high. Similarly, if we analyse the unemployment effect as a function of the share of debt servicing cost, the
marginal effect ranges from 2.7 to 29 percentage points, which indicates that the probability of default after the job loss of
the main wage earner is far greater among overindebted households. 
Charts 4 and 5 portray the probability response curves of the 5th income quintile dummy. The marginal effect of income is
also increasing monotonically with the number of dependants and the share of debt servicing cost. The marginal effects as a
function of the number of dependants and the share of debt servicing cost range from 1 to 6.3 and from 1 to 19 percentage
points respectively.
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Chart 2
Probability response curves of unemployment as a
function of the number of dependants (Network 2)
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Chart 3
Probability response curves of unemployment as a
function of the income share of monthly debt
servicing cost
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25 The first logit model (Logit 1) is used for calculating the probability response curves.
3.2. DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES AND DEBT AT RISK
The above described analysis showed the influence of different factors on the default probability. In this section we look at
default probabilities and debt at risk by grouping households along various single dimensions, taking account of their different
attributes and not allowing for unobserved individual effects.
26
Table C in Appendix 2 shows the mean default probabilities
and debt at risk calculated from the above described models, by the households’ region of residence, disposable income, the
qualification of the household’s head, taking account of the actual circumstances of those in each group.
Regarding the region of residence,
27
the mean PDs and the standard deviation of the probability of default are higher among
households in less developed parts of the country (North-Eastern Hungary, Northern and Southern Plain). Debt at risk is also
the highest in these regions. Depending on the methods used for calculating these risk measures the average PD ranges
between 2 and 7.4 per cent, while debt at risk ranges between 3.5 and 22 per cent. The results are not surprising, as these
areas are characterised by the lowest net average wage income, which is approximately 85 per cent of the county average, and
the highest unemployment and lowest employment rates – 11 and 44 per cent respectively.
28
As a consequence, the share of
debt servicing costs is on average higher, which prevents the accumulation of any reserves and makes these households more
sensitive to shocks.
Analysing risks by the qualification of the household’s head, the results suggest that the average PDs are the highest among
those whose head has a low qualification (mean PDs range between 1.8 and 6.7 per cent, debt at risk ranges between 6.2 and
10.3 per cent). It is true in general that qualification determines both the permanent income and the labour market
possibilities. Low skilled persons are more exposed to adverse movements in the economy, as their work can be easily
substituted. In times of economic downturn firms usually lay off their low skilled workers and keep their high skilled ones.
Therefore, low skilled workers’ income might be more exposed to the cyclical fluctuations of the economy. As a result, high
income variance might contribute to higher variance in the probability of default within this category. This assumption might
be supported by the fact that the standard deviation of the probability of default is the highest among them. 
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Chart 4
Probability response curves of income as a function
of the number of dependants
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Chart 5
Probability response curves of income as a function
of the income share of monthly debt servicing cost
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26 Analysing the distribution by multiple dimensions is of no relevance, due to small sample bias.
27 Central Transdanubium includes the following counties: Fejér, Komárom-Esztergom, Veszprém; Western Transdanubium includes the following counties: Gyõr-
Moson-Sopron, Vas, Zala; Southern Transdanubium includes the following counties: Baranya, Somogy, Tolna; Northeastern Hungary includes the following counties:
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Heves, Nógrád; Northern Plain includes the following counties: Hajdú-Bihar, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok; Southern Plain
includes the following counties: Bács-Kiskun, Békés, Csongrád; Central Hungary includes the following: Pest county and Budapest.
28 Hungary 2006, http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/mo/mo2006.pdf, available only in Hungarian.
Analysing risks by income, both the average PDs and debt at risk are the highest among those households whose income is in
the 1
st
quintile. The average PDs range between 6.2 and 8.6 per cent, while debt at risk is between 10 and 24.2 per cent. The
differences in these measures among other income quintiles are not substantial. It has to be mentioned that the effect of
income is not necessarily separable from the above analysed factors, as mainly these determine which part of the income
distribution the household is located in. Therefore, income is more or less a condensate of information about household’s
riskiness stemming from their given sociodemographic features. 
In summary, debt payment problems are most likely to occur among households which possess the following attributes: the
region of residence is in North-Eastern Hungary, Northern or Southern Plain, the main wage earner has a low qualification
and the household disposable income is in the 1st income quintile. 
In order to get an overall picture about risk concentration within the group of indebted households we employ the index of
concentration of debt at risk – May and Tudela (2005). The index is the ratio of debt at risk and the average probability of
default. As the index varies, either because of the probability of default, the value of the debt outstanding, or the combination
of these, it may promptly reflect the evolution of risks related to retail lending. If the index value exceeds one it indicates that
debt is concentrated among risky households, while values less than or equal to one imply that the risk concentration is not
substantial.
29
The values of the concentration index are 1.37 and 1.36 in the case of the logit and the network models, while 3.07 by using
the non-parametric based framework with original income data, and 2.59 by taking into account the income distortion. The
results suggest that, regardless of the methods used for calculating the concentration index, a substantial part of the loan
portfolio is owed by potentially risky households, which is unfavourable from a financial stability point of view. Risks are
somewhat mitigated by the fact that a substantial part of risky debt is comprised of mortgage loans, which are able to provide
considerable security for banks in the case of default.
3.3. THE STRESS TESTING EXERCISE
Stress tests are tools for analysing the shock-absorbing capacity of the banking system in relation to adverse macroeconomic
events. With stress tests we can judge whether the banking system acts as a ‘stabiliser’ in the economy, i.e. it is able to absorb
shocks and mitigate the negative consequences of business cycle fluctuations or more serious adverse economic events. The
key aspects of stress testing are to identify the sources of risks and the channels through which they are transmitted, and to
measure their effects on the financial system. 
From households’ credit risk point of view two main sources of risks can be considered which have a relatively large
significance: declining employment, and fluctuating exchange and interest rates.
30
The main consequence of the first is
declining disposable income, while the impact of the second on household credit risk develops through the rising cost of debt
servicing (the foreign currency finance of Hungarian households, for instance, makes their balance sheet position sensitive to
exchange rate and foreign interest rate fluctuations, as they do not have natural hedge).
Regarding the risk transmission channels, three can be detected through which the banking activity is principally affected: the
credit risk, the income generation risk and funding risk channels. Funding risk might arise through the credit risk channel as
a result of the worsening profitability related to household lending, which might lower market confidence and raise the cost
of external finance. Banks are faced with income generation risk when the operational environment becomes unfavourable,
which reduces banks’ capacity to generate income (especially net interest and fee income, a substantial proportion of which
is related to household lending). Finally, increasing write-offs reflects the deterioration in households’ payment ability.
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29 For a better understanding of this concept we present a similar example as May and Tudela (2005). Suppose that there are two households A and B. Household A has
a debt of 1,000,000 HUF and B has a debt of 500,000 HUF. Suppose that each household has an equal default probability (10 per cent). Then the total debt at risk is
0.1*1,000,000+0.1*500,000=150,000 HUF, that is 10 per cent of the total debt outstanding and the mean PD is 10 per cent. Suppose instead that household A has a
15 per cent probability of having payment problems, while household B has a PD of 5 per cent. In this case the debt at risk is 0.15*1,000,000+0.05*500,000 = 175,000
HUF and the share of risky debt is 11.6 per cent, which is higher than in the previous case. The mean probability of default is still 10 per cent. The index of
concentration of debt at risk in the former case (i.e. PDs were equal) is 1 while in the latter case (i.e. PDs differ) it is equal to 1.16 since the household with the larger
amount of debt is now more risky. 
30 Probabilities were not assigned to the occurrence of the various scenarios. This is the task of future research. 
In this paper we separately analyse the effects of the most severe employment and financial shock scenarios on banks’ capital
adequacy, and among the risk transmission channels we take into account the credit risk channel. However, the combined
effect of real and financial shocks might have a greater impact on banks capital position than each of the individual shocks
alone. 
As our simulations are static, we have to adopt some simplifying assumptions. First, we presume that, as a result of the shocks,
neither the volume nor the composition of household consumption changes, the household’s labour supply remains
unchanged, and there is no banking adjustment, that is banks do not react to increasing losses by curtailing credit supply, or
portfolio restructuring. In the calculations we further assume that the shocks are permanently maintained, as this ensures that
debt at risk calculated along various shock scenarios becomes defaulted. Data suggest that at least one year is necessary for
the default of all the risky households (i.e. they eat up all their financial savings).
31
Finally, we presume that banks’ household
loan portfolio from a quality point of view is similar to the representative portfolio used. Based on this latter assumption, as
no information on household default probabilities from individual banks is available, when calculating the losses, we use the
same default probability for each bank. The difference between banks is constituted by the product composition of their
portfolio and the product specific loss rates (LGD), which, however, adequately reflects the differences in quality across
individual banking portfolios. 
3.3.1. The effect of rising debt servicing costs on portfolio quality
In the calculation of the effect of rising debt servicing costs we considered the occurrence of the following financial shocks:
a 100, 250 and 500 basis points increase in HUF yields, a 100 and 200 basis points increase in CHF yields, and a 10, 20, 30
per cent depreciation of the forint exchange rate.
32
Depreciation affects monthly debt servicing costs straight-line, while the
effect of interest rates rise is not linear.
33
Since there is uncertainty regarding households’ disposable income, the calculations
regarding the non-parametric approach are performed with the original, and with 10 per cent higher incomes as well.
34
In this
case, both the average PDs, which are the share of households’ with negative financial margin within the total of indebted
households, and debt at risk, which is the debt outstanding of households with negative financial margin, are calculated
directly. 
The ‘shocked’ PDs and debt at risk are also calculated by using the estimated parameters (weights) of the logit and network
models. As a first step, the ‘shocked’ debt servicing cost is determined for each household, then it is inserted into the models
and the new conditional PDs and debt at risk are calculated. Charts 6 and 7 depict the effects of various financial shock
scenarios on debt at risk and on the average default probability. On the charts the effects of only ‘single shocks’ can be seen.
This means that, for instance, when calculating the impact of a 200 basis point CHF interest rate increase, the exchange rate
and HUF interest rate are held constant. Tables about the combined effects of financial shocks can be found in Appendix 2
(Tables D and E).
The results suggest that portfolio quality is more sensitive to exchange rate movements and a CHF yield rise than to an
increase in HUF interest rates. This is due to the denomination and repricing structure of the household loan portfolio.
Regarding the denomination structure, the domestic-foreign currency composition by the end of 2006 was approximately 50-
50 per cent. However, in the case of new loans an 80-90 per cent dominance of foreign currency denomination can be
observed. As a consequence, the exposure of the portfolio to exchange rate risk is permanently increasing. Regarding the
portfolio’s repricing structure, as the share of forint loans with fixed interest rates is relatively high, only a small proportion
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31 The households’ average shock tolerance period – depending on the size of the shock – is between one and three months. This is the average period under which
households eat up their financial savings, provided that their behaviour remains unchanged (i.e. constant consumer preferences, no restructuring of consumption
expenditures, unchanged labour supply).
32 The values of the examined financial shocks are the tails of the historic distributions calculated from the data of the HUF/EUR exchange rate, the 3-month forint yields
and the average 3-month Swiss money market rate between January 2001 and May 2007 (in case of the exchange rate 3, 6 and 8 standard deviation, in case of the
HUF interest rate 1, 2, 3 standard deviation and in the case of the CHF interest rate 1 and 2 standard deviation). The reason for counting with the effect of a CHF
interest rate rise is that approximately 85–90 per cent of total retail FX debt is denominated in Swiss franc.
33 As all the relevant information was available regarding the loan product of a particular household, the individual APRs are calculated. When the effects of rising
interest rates are analysed, the increase of the interest rate is added to the individual APRs, and then the monthly debt servicing costs are recalculated.
34 The PDs from the parametric approaches were not recalculated, as the equal 10 per cent shift in income does not change the relative positions of the households in
the income distribution.
is exposed to HUF interest rate shocks. In contrast, as FX loans involve variable rates with short repricing periods, the role
of foreign interest rate risk (especially CHF) is getting even more prevalent. 
It has to be mentioned that the potential increase in credit risks are mitigated by the high reserves built into the prices and by the
fact that a significant proportion of the debt at risk is comprised of mortgage loans. The risks can be further diminished to some
extent by loan constructions with fixed instalment payments, where any drop in the relevant exchange rate affects the maturity
of the loan instead of increasing the instalment payment. However, these types of loans are not yet widely used. 
3.3.2. The effect of declining employment on portfolio quality
Unemployment directly affects a household’s disposable income and, as a result, its payment ability. In the simulations a 
3 and a 5 per cent decline in employment are considered, which affects only indebted households.
35
Beyond the above
mentioned assumptions (i.e. unchanged consumption, labour supply, no bank reaction) we include some additional
simplifications. First, we presume that unemployment risk does not depend on individual factors such as age, qualification,
etc., so each employee has an equal probability of becoming unemployed. Second, only one household member looses his or
her job and the worker in question will not find new employment in a one year period. Finally, each employee is equally
contributing to the household income.
Notes: The charts depict the single effects of a 10, 20 and 30 per cent exchange rate depreciation and a 500 and 200 basis point HUF and CHF interest
rates rise. The baseline values of debt at risk (i.e. no shock case) are the following: 12.9 and 5.7 per cent in the non-parametric approach with original
income and with a 10 per cent higher income, 4.8 per cent in the case of the first logit model (Logit 1) and 5.5 per cent in the case of the second network
model (Network 2). The baseline values of average default probabilities are the following: 4.2 and 2.2 per cent in the non-parametric approach with
original income and with a 10 per cent higher income, 3.4 per cent in the case of the first logit model (Logit 1) and 4.0 per cent in the case of the second
network model (Network 2).
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Chart 6
Increase in debt at risk to various financial shock
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Chart 7
Increase in the average default probability to
various financial shock scenarios
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35 The average employment rate between 1998 and 2006 was 56 per cent with 1.12 per cent standard deviation. So a 3 and 5 per cent employment decline is equal to
an approximately 3 and 4 standard deviation shock. 
The effects of declining employment are analysed in several different scenarios.
36
We checked how layoffs affect debt at risk
within the entire portfolio, by selecting the unemployed workers randomly from the total sample, while in the second instance
we assumed that layoffs affect a given sector (services, agriculture, industry, trade). The relevance of this latter scenario is
provided on the one hand by the fact that, the exposure of individual sectors to cyclical fluctuations of the economy may
differ significantly, and as a result the developments of employment also show sectoral fluctuations and may be more
dominant in certain sectors. On the other hand, there may be differences between sectors in terms of the composition of loan
portfolio extended to those working in the given sector, which may also affect the developments in losses considerably.
For the ‘selected households’ the new disposable income after unemployment has to be calculated. When each employee
equally contributes to the household income, then the new income is calculated as follows: 
37
(3.1)
where yn is the new income, n is the number of employees of household i, and unemp_aid is the dole. 
For deriving the distributions of the probability of default and debt at risk, unemployed households are randomly drawn 2000
times then the new income, income share of debt servicing cost and unemployment (i.e. unemployment dummy) data is inserted
into the models and the average PDs and debt at risk are recalculated. In the case of the non-parametric approach the debt of
those households whose income reserve becomes negative after the shock is added to the risky loan portfolio. If the margin of
a selected household was already negative, then its debt outstanding was not added again to the risky loan portfolio. Charts 8
and 9 depict the density functions of the increase in the risky loan portfolio, when unemployment is not sector specific.  
The results indicate that the expected increase in debt at risk is lower in the case of the parametric approaches than in the
non-parametric ones. The reason for this lies in the different ways default probabilities are assigned to households in various
models. In the financial margin approach the consequence of unemployment is default by assumption, so the ‘weight’ of
unemployed household’s debt outstanding added to the risky loan portfolio is 1, while in the logit and network models these
‘weights’ (i.e. default probabilities) vary between 0 and 1. 
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Notes: As debt at risk in the baseline case (i.e. without shocks) differs across methods, only the increases relative to the baseline are depicted. The baseline
values of debt at risk are the following: 12.9 and 5.7 per cent in the non-parametric approach with original income and with a 10 per cent higher income,
4.8 per cent in the case of the first logit model (Logit 1) and 5.5 in the case of the second network model (Network 2).
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Chart 9
The effect of a 5 per cent decline in employment on
the share of the risky portfolio (debt at risk)
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36 The sectors analysed are the following: agriculture, commerce, industry, services.
37 We also analyse the sensitivity of our results, when the equal income contribution assumption is loosened. We consider a 50 and a 60 per cent contribution of each
person hit by unemployment to the household’s disposable income. In the case of the 50 per cent contribution the results remain almost the same, while in the case
of the 60 per cent contribution a moderate rise in the debt at risk can be observed relative to the equal contribution case. 
From the charts it is also apparent that two graphs (i.e. financial margin 1 and 2) show a strong congruence, which at first
glance seems surprising. However, the reason is rather simple. The positive effect of a 10 per cent rise in disposable income
on the financial margin is more than offset by the job loss of a wage earner, which might result in a 25 to 100 per cent
38
decline in a household’s disposable income depending on the number of wage earners in the household. 
In Chart 10 and Chart 11 the density functions of the average default probabilities are depicted.  
Regarding the sectoral concentration of unemployment, the portfolio quality is most sensitive to the layoff of workers in the
services, followed by industry, commerce and agriculture. In the case of the service industry, the expected increase in debt at
risk as a result of a 5 per cent decline in employment is 0.97, 1.75 and 3.36 percentage points, regarding the logit, the network
and the financial margin approaches, respectively. It should be noted that the range of products offered by banks grew in 2006
with the appearance of home loans combined with insurance. In the case of unemployment, this insurance provides coverage
for payment of instalments for a predetermined period (typically one year) to prevent any interruption in the continuity of
payments while in search of a job. If these types of loans gain popularity, the impact of any shock in the labour market on
the portfolio could drop.
3.3.3. Analysing the shock-absorbing capacity of the banking system
In this chapter, based on the results of the most severe financial and employment stress scenarios, the shock-absorbing capacity
of the banking system, proxied by the capital adequacy ratio, is analysed. 
In the calculation of the capital adequacy ratio we carried out the following steps. First, we determined the actual capital
adequacy ratio of the banking sector. Then the potential loss based on the most severe stress scenarios was calculated (debt
at risk) by using the four models. From our perspective not the average probability of default but the banking sector’s
exposure to risky households determines directly the amount of possible losses (debt at risk). As our debt at risk definition
can be considered as a weighted average default probability, we think that it is able to better capture the risks than the average
default probability, since it takes into account both the differences among individual household PDs and debt outstanding. In
the calculation, debt at risk, equal for all banks, was multiplied by the single bank’s exposure and then weighted with the
LGDs (loss given default). From the received values the loan loss provisions were deducted. The profitability and the capital
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Notes: The results of the non-parametric approach are not depicted, as the average PD (i.e. the share of households with negative margin) of a given
employment shock is the same. The baseline average default probability is 3.4 per cent in the logit model case and 4.0 per cent in the network case,
respectively.
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Chart 11
Distribution of average default probabilities
(Network 2)
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38 The maximum number of wage earners in a household within the sample was 4.
strength of the banks are influenced by the stress event only in those cases when the losses exceeded the size of the loss
provisions. Finally the new capital adequacy ratios of the sector were built as a weighted average of the individual banks’ ratios
(the weights were the individual banks market share). The calculations were based on year-end data of 2006 and any potential
income that might be generated after 31st December 2006 was not taken into account. 
In the calculations we had to adopt some simplifying assumptions. First, we assumed that banks’ client structures from a
quality point of view are similar. This means that the probability of default and debt at risk are the same for all banks. Second,
we also admitted that these indicators are uniform for all loan types. Banks’ portfolio composition and the product-specific
LGD assumptions imply the only differences among individual institutions. Due to lack of reliable Hungarian data about the
stream of recoveries, workout costs and an appropriate spread for the risk of the recovery, the computation of recovery rates
was not possible. Therefore, we considered a varying loss given default for mortgages
39
and fix 50 and 90 per cent LGD for
vehicle and unsecured loans, respectively. 
The LGD numbers of vehicle and unsecured loans compared to the international practice were considered to be more
conservative. There were three main reasons for using varying mortgage LGDs. First, the share of mortgage loans within
baking retail portfolios is constantly increasing and, as a result, the banking sector’s exposure to real estate market movements
is gradually rising. Second, the development in losses calculated alongside the various shock scenarios might be sensitive to
LGD assumptions in general, and as the literature suggests – Schuermann (2004), for instance – during economic downturns
not only does the volume of risky exposures rise, but the value of collaterals decline. Therefore, neglecting the ‘LGD effect’
might result in the substantial underestimation of losses. Third, due to the lack of information about the value of stress
mortgage LGDs, we tried to handle this problem by sensitivity analysis. 
In the loss calculation we count with the most severe financial and employment shock scenarios. In the financial shock’s case,
the effect of a 30 per cent HUF exchange rate depreciation, 500 basis points HUF interest rate and 200 basis points CHF
interest rate rises were analysed, while in the employment shock the 99th percentile values of the risky portfolio distributions
were reckoned, when indebted households are hit by a 5 per cent employment decline (depicted on Chart 9). Charts 12 and
13 portray the capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector in relation to the most severe shock scenarios as a function of
mortgage LGD.
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Note: In the case of the employment shock, the baseline values of debt at risk were added to the distribution of increments depicted in Chart 9 and then
the 99th percentiles were calculated. 
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Chart 13
The effect of the 5 per cent employment decline on
the capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Mortgage LGD, per cent
Capital adequacy ratio, per cent
Logit 1 (Debt at risk: 7.9%)
Network 2 (Debt at risk: 10.2%)
Financial margin 1 (Debt at risk: 21.2%)
Financial margin 2 (Debt at risk: 13.7%)
39 For a study of how to estimate LGDs for mortgages, see Calem and Lacour-Little (2004). 
The results indicate that the conclusion regarding the shock-absorbing capacity of individual banks as well as the banking
sector is sensitive to the LGD assumptions taken. Up to 10 per cent of mortgage LGD all the models used give robust
conclusions about the capital strength of the sector. Furthermore three models (financial margin 2, logit 1 and network 2)
suggest that up to 30 per cent of mortgage LGD, the capital adequacy ratio does not fall below the current regulatory
minimum of 8 per cent. If we consider the 10 per cent loss rate as the LGD in normal times, then the latter 20-25 percentage
point decline in the recoveries (increase in the loss rate to 30 per cent) can be thought as a stress event, and this assumption
is consistent with the calculations of Frye (2000) who estimated that in depressed periods the LGD of high-quality loans rise
by about the same measure. 
When evaluating the shock-absorbing capacity, one has to keep two further issues in mind. First, as was mentioned above,
the financial margin calculation has a lot of shortcomings, but the main weakness is its excess sensitivity to income and
consumption data uncertainty. Therefore, the results based on the non-parametric approach have to be handled carefully.
Second, in the loss calculations we neglect to measure how the shock propagation affects other sectors in the economy.
However this latter might induce substantial deterioration in the quality of other banking portfolios and can substantially push
the capital adequacy ratio below the regulatory minimum.
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By using three different types of credit risk measurement techniques (financial margin, logit and neural network approaches)
this paper investigated the main idiosyncratic determinants of household credit risk, examined whether the current state of
indebtedness threatens financial stability, and by employing stress tests it analysed the shock-absorbing capacity of the banking
system. 
Estimation results show that the most important idiosyncratic factors of credit risk are the disposable income, the number of
dependants, the share of monthly debt servicing costs and the employment status of the head of the household. Empirical
evidence suggests that effects of unemployment and income on the probability of default monotonically increase with the
number of dependants and the income share of monthly debt servicing costs, that is, these effects are stronger among those
households where the number of dependants or the share of monthly debt servicing costs are originally high. The results also
suggest that debt payment problems are most likely to occur among households living in less developed regions (i.e. North-
Eastern Hungary, the Northern and Southern Plain), where the main wage earner has a low qualification and the household
disposable income is in the 1st income quintile. The results also indicate that a substantial part of the loan portfolio is owed
by potentially risky households, which is unfavourable from a financial stability point of view. However risks are somewhat
mitigated by the fact that a substantial part of risky debt is comprised of mortgage loans, which are able to provide
considerable security for banks in the case of default. 
Regarding the stress test results of the financial shocks, we find that portfolio quality is more sensitive to exchange rate and
CHF interest rate movements than to a forint yield rise, due to the denomination and repricing structure of the household
loan portfolio. In the case of the employment shock, the results suggest that employment decline has considerable effects on
the size of the risky loan portfolio. Regarding the sectoral concentration of unemployment the portfolio quality is most
sensitive to the layoff of workers in services, which is followed by industry, commerce and agriculture. Finally, our findings
reveal that the shock-absorbing capacity of the banking sector as well as individual banks is sufficient under the given loss rate
(LGD) assumptions, that is the capital adequacy ratio would not fall below the current regulatory minimum of 8 per cent even
if the most extreme stress scenarios were to occur. 
There are, however, some limitations. In this regard the static assumptions about the behaviour of households and banks, the
presumption of homogenous portfolio quality, the separate shock analysis (i.e. separate analysis of real and financial shocks)
on banks capital adequacy and the fact that we neglect to measure how the shock propagation affects other economic sectors
should be mentioned. The results provide the first set of microeconomic insights into household credit risk. Drawing on these,
further investigations, including the extension of the above analysis by using panel data and an integrated analysis of
household and corporate sector credit risk, will be aimed at drawing a more refined picture of credit risk and the shock-
absorbing capacity of the banking system.
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4. Summary and conclusion
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Appendix 1: charts
Chart 1a
ROC curve of the first logit model (Logit 1)
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Chart 2a
ROC curve of the second logit model (Logit 2)
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Chart 3a
ROC curve of the first neural network model
(Network 1)
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Chart 4a
ROC curve of the second neural network model
(Network 2)
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Appendix 2: tables
Variable
Mean Median Standard Composition of loans by 
deviation denomination
HUF CHF EUR
Debt
Mortgage Loans (HUF) 4,059,049 3,000,000 3,393,147 62% 33% 5%
Maturity of Mortgage Loans (Month) 150 144 86
Reported LTV 48% 45% 22%
Car Purchase Loans (HUF) 1,628,867 1,500,000 851,931 31% 60% 8%
Maturity of Car Purchase Loans (Month) 48 40 30
Unsecured Loans (HUF) 408,349 200,000 712,000 92% 1% 7%
Maturity of Unsecured Loans (Month) 39 27 15
Number of loan contracts 1.50 1.00 0.81
Income and wealth
Disposable Income (HUF) 170,144 160,483 65,245
Financial Saving (HUF) 139,484 0 521,678
Number of own cars 0.70 1.00 0.77
Reported value of own cars (HUF) 835,335 220,250 1,673,700
Number of own dwellings 0.94 1.00 0.53
Reported value of own dwellings (HUF) 10,962,715 10,000,000 9,103,317
Expenditures
Montly Loan Installment (HUF) 29,695 23,000 25,765
Reported income share of monthly loan installment 22% 15% 13%
Calculated income share of monthly loan installment 18% 15% 14%
Consumption expenditure (HUF) 64,664 60,866 24,436
Overhead expenditure (HUF) 32,118 30,265 11,812
Other household characteristics
Number of dependants 1.31 1.00 1.29
Age of the head of the household 43 45 12
Table A
Descriptive statistics of some selected variables
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Dummy Continuous Comment/Calculation
Job status of the head of the household
Employee X
Private entrepreneur X
Unemployed X
Other inactive
Qualification of the head of the household
Low X
Medium X
High X
Age of the head of the household
-30 X
31-39 X
40-49 X
50-59 X
60- X
Gender of the head of the household
Male X
Female X
Number of dependants X
Region of residence
Central Transdanubium X Counties: Fejér, Komárom-Esztergom, Veszprém
Western Transdanubium X Counties: Gyõr-Moson-Sopron, Vas, Zala
Southern Transdanubium X Counties: Baranya, Somogy, Tolna
Northeastern Hungary X Counties: Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Heves, Nógrád
Northern Plain X Counties: Hajdú-Bihar, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok
Southern Plain X Counties: Bács-Kiskun, Békés, Csongrád
Central Hungary X Pest county and Budapest
Disposable income Upper quintile limits
Quintile 1 X HUF 110946
Quintile 2 X HUF 148597
Quintile 3 X HUF 179149
Quintile 4 X HUF 218790
Quintile 5 X
Financial Saving X Reported value of total financial savings
Real wealth X Reported value of own cars and dwellings
Share of monthly loan inst. X Monthly debt servicing cost/monthly disposable income
Debt to income X Debt/Yearly disposable income
Number of loans X
Loan type X
Foreign (FX) X
Domestic (HUF) X
Foreign and domestic X
Table B
Explanatory variable set
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Debt at risk Probablity of default
Dimension/Model Financial Financial Logit 1 Network 2 Financial Financial Logit 1 Network 2
margin1 margin 2 margin1 margin 2
Region Mean Stdev. Mean Stdev.
Central Hungary 7.1% 4.1% 3.7% 4.6% 2.0% 1.2% 2.3% 3.5% 2.8% 3.3%
Central Transdanubium 12.1% 6.8% 3.7% 4.6% 3.3% 2.2% 2.5% 3.5% 3.1% 3.1%
Western Transdanubium 10.8% 4.7% 5.2% 2.4% 2.8% 4.5% 3.4% 3.3%
Southern Transdanubium 6.8% 2.0% 4.7% 5.4% 2.9% 1.0% 3.7% 4.1% 4.5% 4.3%
Northeastern Hungary 22.0% 18.2% 5.7% 5.9% 7.2% 5.8% 4.1% 5.5% 4.4% 4.5%
Northern Plain 19.6% 6.0% 5.0% 5.9% 7.4% 3.2% 4.3% 5.1% 5.1% 4.5%
Southern Plain 8.1% 3.5% 5.2% 5.9% 4.1% 2.0% 4.7% 7.5% 5.1% 5.5%
Income
Quintile 1 24.2% 19.0% 11.7% 10.0% 8.6% 6.2% 7.6% 8.0% 7.8% 5.4%
Quintile 2 25.9% 14.6% 6.0% 6.5% 6.2% 3.3% 3.3% 3.8% 3.7% 4.1%
Quintile 3 7.3% 4.6% 4.9% 5.3% 2.4% 1.4% 2.9% 3.5% 3.1% 3.1%
Quintile 4 8.6% 5.0% 5.3% 2.4% 2.9% 3.1% 3.2% 3.2%
Quintile 5 8.1% 0.8% 3.2% 1.4% 0.5% 0.5% 2.1% 1.8%
Qualification
Low 10.3% 6.2% 7.3% 7.7% 4.5% 1.8% 6.2% 8.4% 6.7% 6.4%
Medium 12.4% 6.9% 5.3% 5.7% 4.4% 2.6% 3.4% 4.6% 3.9% 4.0%
High 15.5% 1.4% 2.2% 4.1% 3.1% 0.6% 1.8% 2.2% 2.8% 2.2%
Age
-30 18.4% 6.8% 5.2% 5.6% 3.0% 0.7% 3.6% 4.3% 4.3% 4.8%
31-39 11.1% 5.5% 5.1% 5.7% 4.8% 2.9% 4.0% 5.7% 4.5% 4.3%
40-49 14.2% 5.1% 4.8% 5.7% 4.6% 2.1% 3.8% 5.8% 4.4% 4.7%
50-59 14.2% 6.9% 4.0% 4.8% 5.0% 2.7% 2.8% 4.1% 3.3% 3.6%
60- 2.1% 2.1% 2.9% 4.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.8% 1.8% 2.6% 2.1%
Table C
Distribution of the probability of default and debt at risk 
(mean values)
Notes: Central Transdanubium includes the following counties: Fejér, Komárom-Esztergom, Veszprém; Western Transdanubium includes the following
counties: Gyõr-Moson-Sopron, Vas, Zala; Southern Transdanubium includes the following counties: Baranya, Somogy, Tolna; Northeastern Hungary
includes the following counties: Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Heves, Nógrád; Northern Plain includes the following counties: Hajdú-Bihar, Szabolcs-Szatmár-
Bereg, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok; Southern Plain includes the following counties: Bács-Kiskun, Békés, Csongrád; Central Hungary includes the following:
Pest county and Budapest. Upper quintile limits are the following: 1. quintile: HUF 110,946, 2. quintile: HUF 148,597, 3. quintile: HUF 179,149, 
4. quintile: HUF 218,790. 
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Average unconditional probability of default (non-parametric approach)
Original income Original income plus 10 per cent
CHF interest rate shock: 0
HUF Interest rate shock/HUF depreciation 0 10% 20% 30% 0 10% 20% 30%
0 4.2% 5.1% 6.0% 7.4% 2.2% 2.6% 3.0% 3.5%
100 bp 4.2% 5.1% 6.0% 7.4% 2.2% 2.6% 3.0% 3.5%
250 bp 4.5% 5.4% 6.3% 7.6% 2.2% 2.6% 3.0% 3.5%
500 bp 5.0% 5.8% 6.8% 8.1% 2.5% 2.9% 3.3% 3.8%
CHF interest rate shock: 100 bp
HUF Interest rate shock/HUF depreciation 0 10% 20% 30% 0 10% 20% 30%
0 4.4% 5.4% 6.8% 7.5% 2.3% 2.7% 3.2% 3.9%
100 bp 4.4% 5.4% 6.8% 7.5% 2.3% 2.7% 3.2% 3.9%
250 bp 4.7% 5.7% 7.1% 7.7% 2.3% 2.7% 3.2% 3.9%
500 bp 5.2% 6.2% 7.6% 8.2% 2.6% 3.0% 3.4% 4.2%
CHF interest rate shock: 200 bp
HUF Interest rate shock/HUF depreciation 0 10% 20% 30% 0 10% 20% 30%
0 4.7% 5.8% 7.1% 7.7% 2.4% 2.8% 3.5% 4.2%
100 bp 4.7% 5.8% 7.1% 7.7% 2.4% 2.8% 3.5% 4.2%
250 bp 5.0% 6.1% 7.4% 8.0% 2.4% 2.8% 3.5% 4.2%
500 bp 5.4% 6.6% 7.8% 8.5% 2.7% 3.1% 3.8% 4.5%
Average conditional probability of default (parametric approach)
Logit 1 Network 2
CHF interest rate shock: 0
HUF Interest rate shock/HUF depreciation 0 10% 20% 30% 0 10% 20% 30%
0 3.4% 3.6% 3.8% 3.9% 4.0% 4.2% 4.3% 4.4%
100 bp 3.5% 3.6% 3.8% 4.0% 4.0% 4.2% 4.3% 4.4%
250 bp 3.5% 3.6% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 4.2% 4.3% 4.4%
500 bp 3.5% 3.7% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 4.2% 4.3% 4.5%
CHF interest rate shock: 100 bp
HUF Interest rate shock/HUF depreciation 0 10% 20% 30% 0 10% 20% 30%
0 3.6% 3.8% 4.0% 4.3% 4.3% 4.4% 4.5% 4.7%
100 bp 3.6% 3.8% 4.1% 4.3% 4.3% 4.4% 4.6% 4.7%
250 bp 3.7% 3.9% 4.1% 4.3% 4.3% 4.4% 4.6% 4.7%
500 bp 3.7% 3.9% 4.1% 4.4% 4.3% 4.5% 4.6% 4.7%
CHF interest rate shock: 200 bp
HUF Interest rate shock/HUF depreciation 0 10% 20% 30% 0 10% 20% 30%
0 3.7% 3.9% 4.1% 4.3% 4.5% 4.6% 4.8% 4.9%
100 bp 3.7% 3.9% 4.1% 4.3% 4.5% 4.6% 4.8% 5.0%
250 bp 3.7% 3.9% 4.1% 4.4% 4.5% 4.6% 4.8% 5.0%
500 bp 3.7% 3.9% 4.2% 4.4% 4.5% 4.7% 4.8% 5.0%
Table D
Average default probabilities by various financial shock scenarios and model specifications 
(one year horizon)
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Debt at risk (non-parametric approach)
Original income Original income plus 10 per cent
CHF interest rate shock: 0
HUF Interest rate shock/HUF depreciation 0 10% 20% 30% 0 10% 20% 30%
0 12.9% 15.5% 18.1% 21.5% 5.7% 7.8% 9.0% 10.6%
100 bp 13.2% 15.5% 18.1% 21.5% 5.7% 7.8% 9.0% 10.6%
250 bp 14.1% 16.4% 19.0% 22.4% 5.7% 7.8% 9.0% 10.6%
500 bp 14.9% 17.2% 19.8% 23.2% 6.6% 8.8% 10.0% 11.6%
CHF interest rate shock: 100 bp
HUF Interest rate shock/HUF depreciation 0 10% 20% 30% 0 10% 20% 30%
0 13.4% 16.8% 20.6% 21.7% 6.8% 8.5% 9.6% 12.1%
100 bp 13.7% 16.8% 20.6% 21.7% 6.8% 8.5% 9.6% 12.1%
250 bp 14.6% 17.8% 21.6% 22.6% 6.8% 8.5% 9.6% 12.1%
500 bp 15.4% 18.5% 22.6% 23.4% 7.8% 9.5% 10.6% 13.1%
CHF interest rate shock: 200 bp
HUF Interest rate shock/HUF depreciation 0 10% 20% 30% 0 10% 20% 30%
0 14.3% 17.9% 21.6% 22.8% 7.2% 8.8% 11.3% 12.8%
100 bp 14.6% 17.9% 21.6% 22.8% 7.2% 8.8% 11.3% 12.8%
250 bp 15.5% 18.8% 22.5% 23.7% 7.2% 8.8% 11.3% 12.8%
500 bp 16.3% 19.6% 23.3% 24.5% 8.2% 9.8% 12.3% 13.8%
Debt at risk (parametric approach)
Logit 1 Network 2
CHF interest rate shock: 0
HUF Interest rate shock/HUF depreciation 0 10% 20% 30% 0 10% 20% 30%
0 3.4% 3.6% 3.8% 3.9% 4.0% 4.2% 4.3% 4.4%
100 bp 3.5% 3.6% 3.8% 4.0% 4.0% 4.2% 4.3% 4.4%
250 bp 3.5% 3.6% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 4.2% 4.3% 4.4%
500 bp 3.5% 3.7% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 4.2% 4.3% 4.5%
CHF interest rate shock: 100 bp
HUF Interest rate shock/HUF depreciation 0 10% 20% 30% 0 10% 20% 30%
0 5.2% 5.6% 6.1% 6.6% 6.0% 6.3% 6.6% 6.9%
100 bp 5.2% 5.6% 6.1% 6.6% 6.0% 6.4% 6.7% 7.0%
250 bp 5.3% 5.7% 6.2% 6.7% 6.1% 6.4% 6.7% 7.0%
500 bp 5.4% 5.8% 6.3% 6.8% 6.1% 6.4% 6.7% 7.1%
CHF interest rate shock: 200 bp
HUF Interest rate shock/HUF depreciation 0 10% 20% 30% 0 10% 20% 30%
0 5.3% 5.7% 6.2% 6.8% 6.5% 6.8% 7.1% 7.5%
100 bp 5.3% 5.7% 6.2% 6.8% 6.5% 6.8% 7.2% 7.5%
250 bp 5.4% 5.8% 6.3% 6.8% 6.5% 6.9% 7.2% 7.6%
500 bp 5.5% 5.9% 6.4% 6.9% 6.6% 6.9% 7.3% 7.6%
Table E
Debt at risk by various financial shock scenarios and model specifications 
(one year horizon)
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